University of New Mexico

UNM Digital Repository
NotiSur

Latin America Digital Beat (LADB)

10-29-1993

Grenada: A Decade Later
Erika Harding

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur
Recommended Citation
Harding, Erika. "Grenada: A Decade Later." (1993). https://digitalrepository.unm.edu/notisur/11236

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Latin America Digital Beat (LADB) at UNM Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in NotiSur by an authorized administrator of UNM Digital Repository. For more information, please contact amywinter@unm.edu.

LADB Article Id: 057233
ISSN: 1060-4189

Grenada: A Decade Later
by Erika Harding
Category/Department: General
Published: Friday, October 29, 1993
[The following article was written by Bess Abrahams and Lourdes Prado from the Washingtonbased Council on Hemispheric Affairs (COHA). The article is reproduced with COHA's permission.]
As the Clinton administration hastily considers the policy option of military intervention in Haiti,
the memory of the US invasion of another Caribbean island could prove instructive. This week
marks the tenth anniversary of the Reagan administration's deployment of troops to Grenada,
professedly to protect and evacuate threatened US citizens, neutralize the leftist regime and
Cuban airport construction personnel and bring an end to violence and political turmoil by
restoring democracy. The ensuing experience sheds light on this country's interventionist process,
demonstrating the extent to which the White House is prepared to deceive and dissemble to gain
the public's support. It also establishes that Washington, to its cost, finds it alluringly easier to
overthrow a despised regime than to foster the development of a viable political alternative through
skillful diplomacy, with Panama and Nicaragua providing the evidence for that maxim. Clearly, the
Reagan administration was more concerned with catering to a presidential obsession of creating
a Marxist-free hemisphere, after what it perceived as president Carter's soft stance on this issue,
than with guaranteeing Grenada's long-term political and economic stability. Adamantly insisting
that the island had become a totalitarian state that threatened US national security, Washington
dispatched a massive US task force, along with a cosmetic sprinkling of Eastern Caribbean police
contingents to provide the operation with some legitimacy, which effortlessly overwhelmed
Grenada's handful of defenders. By November 15, an interim government made up of local
technocrats, under the close supervision of US advisors, began implementing economic and political
programs authored in Washington. Condemnation of the invasion was significant, even though
short-lived, with official protests coming from Canada, Britain, many other European countries,
and most of Latin America. Reagan insisted his action was in response to a petition from other
endangered Caribbean nations, when the opposite probably was the case, with the communication
requesting US assistance most likely drafted in Washington, wired to the Eastern Caribbean, and
then returned to Washington for public release. The US president also justified the landing by
saying that it was to prevent Grenada from using the airport under construction to service Cuba's
military involvement in Africa and as a key link for Soviet-Cuban subversion throughout the
hemisphere. In reality, the airport was devoid of military features, and its construction originally
had been recommended by the UN and the US Agency for International Development to bolster
Grenada's tourism industry. It is disheartening that the Reagan administration consistently lied to
justify its inadmissible conduct toward the island. US students at St. George's University Medical
School, whose fate allegedly provided the main basis for the invasion, were never in danger, as
attested to by the medical school's Vice Chancellor, Geoffrey Bourne. In fact, Washington persuaded
Barbados Prime Minister Tom Adams to close down the Bridgetown airport, the only available
escape route, which local Grenadian authorities had offered to facilitate the students' departure,
to prevent the students from leaving Grenada. But had the students been able to leave, a prime
excuse for the US invasion would have been removed. In spite of charges made on the invasion's
eve, the US has never released a single document of the thousands that it captured at the time of
the landing, indicating that the airport or any other Grenada facility posed any threat to the US
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or any other country, or that any leftist conspiracy was being hatched in conjunction with Cuba
and the Soviet Union. While the Reagan administration's goal of installing a pro-US government
was met, the absence of a subsequent comprehensive plan to establish a framework within which
Grenadians could achieve economic independence undermined its success. Much of the US$100
million in US aid allocated there in the mid-1980s was spent on developing the infrastructure for
an export-oriented economy, while hardly any funds were provided to encourage local sustainable
development projects. The disappearance of US financial support in recent years because the
island no longer poses a "threat" has compounded a variety of social and economic ills. Grenada's
education, health and welfare systems are in disarray, and there is little hope that changes can be
made without major financial backing from the international community. Meanwhile, the island
suffers from unprecedented levels of drug and alcohol addiction, an unemployment rate of nearly
40%, and a profound malaise affecting young Grenadians. While a free market orientation may
be part of the appropriate answer to the development requirements of resource-scarce Caribbean
nations like Grenada, the social costs of furthering Washington's political and economic agendas
must not be overlooked.
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